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Abstract:  This article questions the conditions in which solidarity is given or withheld 
in response to expressions of dissent. Drawing on the August 2011 riots in England as 
an example, the article reflects on why some forms of dissent attract support 
whereas others do not. The author argues that ‘unpalatable’ forms of dissent, 
particularly those enacted by groups already constructed as deviant or suspect, are 
often figured as least deserving of support, even though their actions may arise from 
the highest needs. The article then considers how these patterns can occur in 
response to more everyday articulations of dissent, such as those expressed by 
disenfranchised university students. The article suggests a rethinking of the politics 
of dissent and the distribution of solidarity in order to be more attentive to broader 
patterns of power and dispossession. 
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For four days in August 2011 riots swept across the city of London.  What initially 
began as a peaceful demonstration outside Tottenham police station - to protest the 
fatal police shooting of 29-year old Mark Duggan - soon erupted into full-scale 
confrontations with police, extensive property damage, and widespread looting.   
The anger expressed on the streets had no doubt been simmering for years against a 
backdrop of tense police-community relations, highly racialized stop-and-search 
practices, cutbacks to social services, as well as chronic poverty and unemployment -
- the enduring effects of prolonged social abandonment and dispossession.1  
 
                                                        
1 Lewis, Newburn, Taylor and Mcgillivray, Reading the Riots: Investigating England's 
summer of disorder (The Guardian & London School of Economics and Political 
Science, 2012); Kawalerowicz and Biggs, 'Anarchy in the UK: Economic Deprivation, 
Social Disorganization, and Political Grievances in the London Riot of 2011', Social 
Forces 94 (2015), pp. 673-98; Stott, Drury and Reicher, 'On the Role of a Social 
Identity Analysis in Articulating Structure and Collective Action: The 2011 Riots in 
Tottenham and Hackney', The British Journal of Criminology 57 (2017), pp. 964-81. 
This is a preprint of an article whose final and definitive form has been published 
in the journal Law Culture and the Humanities and is available online at: 
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1743872118809676 




By day three, the riots had spread to other cities across England, including 
Birmingham, Liverpool, Manchester, Gloucester, Nottingham, and West Bromwich.  
An estimated fifteen thousand people took part in the unrest, which saw 
neighborhoods transformed into scenes of burning cars and buildings, smashed 
windows, looted shops, and angry clashes with police. Damage in the city of London 
alone was estimated to have totaled £300 million.2 During the unrest, one man was 
shot dead in Croydon, another was attacked in Ealing and later died in hospital, and 
three others were run down and killed by a car in Birmingham whilst trying to 
protect a shop from looters.3  Tens of thousands of police officers were deployed to 
take back control of the streets and more than 4700 people were arrested. The 
events were described as Britain’s ‘most significant and widespread urban unrest in 
at least a generation’.4 
 
Media commentators on both left and right were quick to condemn the riots.5 
Despite disparate views on the root causes and heated debates about whether the 
riots should be described as ‘political’, there was near unanimity on the need to 
reassert a clear line between ‘legitimate protest’ and ‘criminality pure and simple’6.  
As Labour Member of Parliament for Tooting, Sadiq Khan (later to become Mayor of 
London) wrote in the Evening Standard:  
[L]et's be clear: what we've witnessed across our London boroughs is not a 
genuine outlet of political angst, nor a reaction to police conduct. It is simply 
criminality on a devastating scale. There is no excuse. The people looting 
sports ware stores, electrical shops and department stores weren't thinking 
about what happened to Mark Duggan. They weren't thinking about the 
stagnating economy or public service cuts. Their motivation was to wreak 
havoc and perhaps grab a pair of trainers or a TV along the way.7  
Khan’s comments were by no means exceptional. Commentators on all sides of the 
political spectrum seemed to reach a vociferous consensus that the riots were 
                                                        
2 Lewis, Newburn, Taylor and Mcgillivray. 
3 The Guardian, UK riots aftermath - Friday 12 August 2011 (The Guardian, 2011). 
https://www.theguardian.com/uk/blog/2011/aug/12/uk-riots-day-six-aftermath 
Accessed 1 August 2017. 
4 Trott, 'Rebellious Subjects: The Politics of Engand's 2011 Riots - Introduction', South 
Atlantic Quarterly 112 (2013), pp. 538-40. See also Cadwalladr, The man accused of 
starting the 2011 riots, The Guardian, 26 June 2016, 
https://www.theguardian.com/society/2016/jun/26/man-accused-of-starting-2011-
london-riots-mark-duggan Accessed 1 August 2017. 
5 Ciccariello-Maher, Planet of Slums, Age of Riots, Counterpunch, 2011. 
https://www.counterpunch.org/2011/08/12/planet-of-slums-age-of-riots/, accessed 
1 August 2017. 
6 Cameron, Riots: David Cameron's Commons statement in full, BBC News, 2011. 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-14492789, accessed 1 August 2017. 
7 Khan, Riots are not a genuine outlet of political angst, (Evening Standard, 2011), 9 
August 2011. https://www.standard.co.uk/news/riots-are-not-a-genuine-outlet-of-
political-angst-6431047.html , accessed 1 August 2017. 
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ultimately ‘devoid of any political coherence’ or credibility. 8  The overarching 
narrative that emerged was that while the initial demonstration outside the police 
station fell within the proper terrain of political dissent, everything else that 
followed did not. While some rioters may have had legitimate grievances, most were 
simply opportunistic hoodlums. Either way, the rioters’ discontent was not 
commensurate with their actions.  
 
Even amongst prominent left commentators, efforts to diagnose the complex 
undercurrents of the riots were frequently eclipsed by an overarching narrative that 
while the underlying causes of the riots might have been political, the rioters 
themselves were not—at least not properly constituted political subjects. While a 
subsequent investigative research project, which interviewed 270 participants in the 
riots, found that poverty, policing, government policy, unemployment, and the killing 
of Mark Duggan were amongst the most important causes cited by interviewees9, 
many commentators dismissed these findings as a convenient after-story to re-
narrate what was in most cases little more than opportunist violence and theft.10 
These dismissals were no doubt aided by the endless media circulation of CCTV 
camera images of young, mostly black, partially hooded faces, splashed across major 
newspapers and re-circulated on social media with tabloid headlines calling for the 
public to identify and report these ‘thugs’ to police.11 The selectivity of these images, 
and the racial and class stereotypes they played upon, contributed to the broader 
media narrative that the majority of those who participated in the unrest were out-
of-control, feral youth who lacked the requisite consciousness, rhetoric or demands 
to credibly justify their actions on political grounds.  
It was the widespread looting and property destruction in local neighborhoods that 
was particularly troubling to commentators.12 Many were eager to point out that 
corporate stores were not the only sites of looting, but local shops were also 
                                                        
8 Younge, These riots were political.They were looting, not shoplifting. The Guardian, 
2011, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/aug/14/young-british-
rioters-political-actions , accessed 1 August 2017. 
9 Lewis, Newburn, Taylor and Mcgillivray. See also Kawalerowicz and Biggs, pp. 673-
98. 
10 For a detailed overview of media commentaries at the time which reiterated this 
sentiment, see Reicher and Stott, Mad Mobs and Englishmen? Myths and realities of 
the 2011 riots (London, Constable & Robinson Ltd, 2011). See also Treadwell, Briggs, 
Winlow and Hall, 'Shopocalypse Now: Consumer Culture and the English Riots of 
2011', British Journal of Criminology 53 (2013), pp. 1-17.  
11 Daily Mail Reporter, Do you know these lotting suspects? Police release a handful 
of pictures (but we've found 40 more to be going on with) (The Daily Mail (Online), 2 
September 2011), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2024120/London-riots-
2011-suspects-Photos-released-know-looters.html, accessed 1 August 2017. 
 Accessed 1 August 2017. See also Imogen Tyler, Revolting Subjects: Social abjection 
and resistance in neoliberal Britain (London, Zed Books, 2013). 
12 Newburn, Cooper, Deacon and Diski, 'Shopping for Free? Looting, Consumerism 
and the 2011 Riots', The British Journal of Criminology 55 (2015), pp. 987-1004. 
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targeted -- evidence that if the rioters had any form of political analysis they would 
have been more selective.13  Likewise the looting of high-end re-sellable goods like 
large screen TVs, as well as brand name clothing and sneakers, were used as further 
evidence of selfish rather than political motivations.14  
If anything, the actions of the rioters were deemed to be symptomatic of all that had 
gone wrong with contemporary social norms and values. As Zygmunt Bauman 
argued, the riots were a sign of ‘consumerism come home to roost’ with participants 
simply mimicking the behavior and values of elites and of consumer society at 
large.15 David Harvey reached a similar conclusion: “slash and burn is now openly 
the motto of the ruling classes pretty much everywhere” and as such, the rioters 
were “only doing what everyone else is doing, though in a different way – more 
blatantly and visibly in the streets.”16 Slavoj Žižek and others suggested that the main 
enigma of the unrest was that the rioters had no clear demands.  Instead their 
actions took the shape of “a meaningless outburst” that lacked any clear political 
programme; it was “impotent rage and despair masked as a display of force; it is 
envy masked as triumphant carnival.”17 
 
These diagnoses, though perhaps intended to reframe questions of individual 
conduct around underlying social causes, nonetheless fed into the broader assertion 
that the rioters were unworthy political subjects. At best, any sympathy or 
understanding that might be directed towards the rioters was warranted not 
because they were expressing any legitimate form of dissent, but because we could 
not expect anything better from them; their actions were simply a collateral 
consequence of ‘feral capitalism’.18 The few commentators who refused to follow 
the expected public script of explicitly condemning first and conditionally explaining 
second - and instead expressed sympathy for those engaged in property damage or 
looting - were swiftly lambasted by the media and in at least one case, an activist-
columnist lost his job.19  
 
                                                        
13 Žižek, Shoplifters of the World Unite (London Review of Books, 2011). However, 
for evidence of more selective targeting, see Stott, Drury and Reicher, pp. 971. 
14 Treadwell, Briggs, Winlow and Hall, pp. 1-17. 
15 Bauman, The London Riots - On Consumerism Coming Home To Roost (Social 
Europe, 2011), https://www.socialeurope.eu/the-london-riots-on-consumerism-
coming-home-to-roost , accessed 1 August 2017. 
16 Harvey, Feral Capitalism Hits the Streets (DavidHarvey.org, 2011). 
http://davidharvey.org/2011/08/feral-capitalism-hits-the-streets/ , accessed 1 
August 2017. 
17 Žižek. See also Hall and Winlow, The English Riots of 2011: Misreadings the Signs 
on the Road to the Society of Enemies ed. Pritchard and Pakes, Basingstoke, UK, 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2014). 
18 Harvey. 
19 Jody McIntyre dumped as Indpendent blogger after riot comments, 8 August 2011, 
https://politicalscrapbook.net/2011/08/jody-mcintyre-independent/ , accessed 16 
August 2017.  
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The widespread assertion that the riots were little more than mob violence was 
oddly ahistorical in the sense that such allegations failed to acknowledge how 
consistently this charge has been made against rioters in the past. 20   These 
sentiments also failed to acknowledge how commonly property destruction, 
takeover and theft have featured in expressions of protest throughout British history 
– with similar levels of outrage in response.21  
 
While many comparisons were drawn to previous riots in London, most notably the 
Brixton Riots of 1981 and the Broadwater Farm riots of 1985, the comparison was 
frequently made precisely to argue that previous cases of unrest were genuinely 
political, whereas the contemporary riots were not. Moreover, even if the 2011 
rioters’ actions could be interpreted as a collective expression of rebellion against 
their circumstances, this malcontent was largely deemed unwarranted. As Paul 
Gilroy observed, “One regularly repeated popular sentiment suggested that thirty 
years earlier there had really been things to complain about, while nowadays, things 
were not so bad as to justify the rioters ‘mindless violence.’”22 There seemed to be a 
collective amnesia around the looting that had been present during earlier periods 
of unrest23combined with a nostalgic left lamentation for supposed days gone by 
when street insurrections were properly political.  
 
There was also a general failure to recognize that the riots did not play out the same 
way in all locales. The unrest in some boroughs, such as Hackney and Tottenham, 
was characterized primarily by confrontations with police, whereas other areas such 
as Croydon and Ealing were more focused on looting and property destruction, 
which targeted the more affluent parts of the borough.24 Likewise, participants had 
varying and complex motives for their involvement—as evidenced by the wide range 
of explanations offered by those interviewed at the time and subsequently—such 
that singular and simplistic explanations were bound to be inadequate.    
 
Yet in the aftermath of the riots, much of the discussion was centered, directly and 
indirectly, on the question of what counts as legitimate dissent -- and the extent to 
which rioters were worthy of sympathy or whether they should be subject to the full 
force of law. In this sense, the discussions marked a reinvigoration of longstanding 
debates around the ever-fraught dividing line between dissent and criminality. 
                                                        
20 Debord, The Decline and Fall of the Spectale Commodity Economy (Situationalist 
International Online, 1966); Pearson, Hooligan: A history of respectable fears 
(Basingstoke and London, Macmillan Education, 1983); Reicher and Stott;  Newburn, 
Cooper, Deacon and Diski, pp. 987-1004; Rudé, The Crowd in History: A study of 
Popular Disturbances in France and England, 1730-1848 (London, Lawrence and 
Wishart, 1981).  
21 Pearson; Rudé; Hobsbawm, 'The Machine Breakers', Past & Present (1952), pp. 57-
70. 
22 Gilroy, '1981 and 2011: From Social Democratic to Neoliberal Rioting', South 
Atlantic Quarterly 112 (2013), pp. 555. 
23 Newburn, Cooper, Deacon and Diski, pp. 987-1004. 
24 Reicher and Stott; Stott, Drury and Reicher, pp. 964-81. 
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Whether pointing to the lack of coherent demands, the unintelligibility or 
illegitimacy of grievances, or the regrettable form in which the dissent was 
expressed, the constant effort to diagnose what was wrong with the rioters was 
frequently reiterated in order to distinguish their actions from genuine political 
resistance. Yet it was the incessant reassertion of the dividing line, which ironically 
seemed to blur it. The almost obsessive insistence on the non-political, non-
legitimate nature of the rioters seemed to expose a widespread anxiety that the 
contrary might be true.  
 
Why do these debates matter so much? In part, they remain important because the 
place where the line is drawn between dissent and criminality is often the deciding 
factor in broader questions of political and social solidarity. These lines determine 
who will be defended and who will not, who will be supported and who will be 
abandoned and ostracized. Certainly the rush of (mostly white, middle class) 
community members to join the ‘broom brigade’ to clean up the streets in the 
aftermath of the riots was not paralleled by a rush to offer legal defense and 
community resources to the (mostly non-white, working class) rioters facing harsh 
prison sentences.25 If dissent generates high stakes consequences – in this case five 
deaths, businesses and homes destroyed, lives ruined by criminal records and prison 
sentences, and communities divided in the aftermath—then the need for support 
and solidarity is high, regardless of whether one condones the original actions. 
Otherwise, those who bear the brunt of the fallout—be it those who participated in 
the riots or those forced to deal with the after-effects (often overlapping 
constituencies)—will be left with a burden that is likely to exacerbate and entrench 
the very power relations and social animosities that contributed to the riots in the 
first place. 
 
In this sense, the question of whether the riots or the rioters should be deemed 
‘political’ per se, might be less important than what the debates themselves reveal 
about the contemporary boundaries of legitimate and worthy dissent. At the heart 
of these debates is much more than a ‘correct’ diagnosis of the specific events that 
took place in August 2011; at stake are much larger questions around how the 
drawing of these boundaries shape the terms, possibilities and expectations for 
political and social solidarity more broadly. The stories that are told about the riots 
matter not only with respect to the question of who should or should not be subject 
to state punishment, but also contribute to the re-articulation of broader lines 
between the deserving and the undeserving; between those entitled to sympathy 
and understanding and those relegated to state-sanctioned social abandonment and 
dispossession.  
 
Arguably, the broader political terrain upon which acts of dissent are heard, 
understood and responded to has changed significantly over the past few decades. 
As Paul Gilroy suggested, the differences in perception towards the riots of the 
                                                        
25 Ministry of Justice (UK), Statistical bulletin on the public disorder of 6th to 9th 
August 2011 - September 2012 update (Justice Statistic Analyitical Services, Ministry 
of Justice, 2012). 
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1980s versus those of 2011 reveal how vastly the political landscape had shifted 
between the two periods of unrest:  
 
The depth of the neoliberal revolution that Britain had undergone during the 
three intervening decades was conveyed above all by the way that the new 
norms specified by generalized individuation and privatization were able to 
reframe the disorders as a brisk sequence of criminal events and 
transgressions that could be intelligible only when seen on the scale of 
personal conduct. Similarly, repairing the damage accomplished by the rioters 
was not primarily a social phenomenon but rather a matter of individual 
responsibility. Society had been abolished long ago.26  
 
Understood within this broader lens, it seems that the very terms upon which 
determinations of ‘proper and legitimate’ dissent are made—and in turn the basis 
upon which the distribution of social and political solidarity is given—have become 
ever more narrow.   
 
When contrasting the government responses to the 1981 and 2011 riots, the former 
arguably resulted in more significant legal reforms, as prompted by the Scarman 
Report. Despite its tacit re-inscription of notions of black criminality and an 
unwillingness to acknowledge institutional racism as a problem in policing,27 the 
Scarman Report nonetheless recognized key failures in policing and in turn 
generated a number of important law and policy changes. This included reforms to 
stop and search practices, funding to address urban poverty and racial disadvantage, 
and the creation of the Police Complaints Authority (later to become the 
Independent Police Complaint Commission).  The 2011 riots, by contrast, resulted 
largely in a withdrawal of social supports, a reassertion of individual 
responsiblization discourses and an extension of punitive law and order regimes.  
 
These differential responses raise a number of larger questions. Namely, what do we 
see, hear and recognize as dissent?  What conditions make some grievances 
rendered intelligible as dissent and others dismissed as unjustified unruliness, bad 
behavior or criminality? By what criteria is dissent differentiated from other 
expressions of discontent?  What are the wider implications of how these 
boundaries are drawn?  
 
Ultimately I want to pose these questions as they pertain to broader patterns of 
racialised social exclusion and the processes by which particular groups of people 
become subject to what Ruth Wilson Gilmore describes as “the state-sanctioned or 
extralegal production and exploitation of group-differentiated vulnerability to 
premature death.”28  Certainly groups who are criminalized and imprisoned are 
                                                        
26 Gilroy, pp. 550-8. 
27 See Gilroy, There Ain't no Black in the Union Jack: The Cultural Polics of Race and 
Nation (London, Routledge, 1987/2002). 
28 Gilmore, Golden Gulag: Prisons, Surplus, Crisis, and Opposition in Globalizing 
California (Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 2007), p. 247. 
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among those whose life chances are significantly diminished, as are those whose 
voices are not heard, whose experiences are denied and whose material conditions 
subject them to ever worsening levels of social deprivation. Hence, the assertion of 
narrow boundary lines for determining what kinds of dissent are worthy of defense 
versus those that may be criminalized, dismissed or demonized can be understood 
as a part of the wider conditions by which racial and class inequalities are tacitly 
permitted, normalized and reinforced—not only by right wing discourses, but by also 
by seemingly ‘progressive’ and ‘leftwing’ politics.29 
 
In this case, the consequences of rioters’ criminal convictions extended well beyond 
their actual sentences and impacted the ability to secure basic needs such as 
housing, employment and education. Immediately following the riots, for example, 
the UK government introduced new legislation to enable landlords to evict any 
tenant who had participated in a riot – even if the riot did not take place in the 
vicinity of the residence in question. 30  The government also introduced new 
‘mandatory grounds of eviction’ whereby courts lose discretion and are required to 
order evictions when certain conditions are met, including breaches of anti-social 
behavior injunctions.31 In such circumstances, the evicted tenant can be considered 
to have made themselves ‘voluntarily homeless’ (on that grounds that they should 
have foreseen the consequences of their behavior) and thereby lose all entitlement 
to social housing.32 While it is not yet clear how frequently these new powers have 
been used, the legislation itself marks a broader trend in the escalation of state-
sanctioned social abandonment of criminalized people. There were also calls to 
withdraw social assistance payments from any families whose members were 
involved in the riots – a call that was not implemented but undoubtedly contributed 
to a broader punitive mood.33  In this sense, the wider implications of not defending 
the rioters (in part by constructing them as indefensible) had wide-ranging 
consequences, with the effects most adversely impacting those already most socially 
disadvantaged.  
 
                                                        
29 I recognize that the categories of ‘left’ and ‘right’ are contested and problematic, 
as is the label of ‘progressive politics’, but they are nonetheless useful here as broad 
terms by which to identify key differences in political values. 
30 Under Section 99 of the Anti-social Behavior, Crime and Policing Act 2014, 
landlords may evict a tenant if they have been convicted of an offence committed at 
the scene of a riot anywhere in the UK. See also, UK Government - Department for 
Communities and Local Government, Strengthening Powers of Possession for Anti-
Social Behaviour: Summary of responses to consultation and next steps (Department 
for Communities and Local Government, 2012). 
31 These conditions include circumstances where a tenant, a member of the tenant’s 
household, or a tenant’s guest, is convicted of a serious offence that occurred in the 
locality of the dwelling or occurred elsewhere but against a person who lives in the 
locality. See Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014. 
32 UK Government - Department for Communities and Local Government. 
33 Tyler. 
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Part of the indefensibility of the rioters stemmed from the fact that they expressed 
their discontent in an unpalatable form; their actions did not fit within the standard 
repertoires of legitimate dissent that the left has traditionally romanticized and 
valorized. The rioters were seen as militant, but not disciplined; impulsive rather 
than organized; expressive but not articulate; targeted but not strategic. Their 
actions involved group collaboration, but not collective mobilization. Overall, their 
actions were messy, incoherent and chaotic, their motives inconsistent and mixed. 
The mode, expression and targets of their dissent generated discomfort, unease and 
tension.  
 
Yet tension arguably lies at the heart of every expression of dissent. It is precisely the 
sense of friction that arises from the withdrawing of consent, the articulation of 
defiance, and the interruption of ‘business-as-usual’ that differentiates dissent from 
mere disagreement. In his famous ‘Letter from a Birmingham Jail’, Martin Luther 
King Jr. writes about the importance of tension as a strategic means for change. 
“Nonviolent direct action seeks to create such a crisis and foster such a tension that 
a community which has constantly refused to negotiate is forced to confront the 
issue. It seeks so to dramatize the issue that it can no longer be ignored.”34 Of 
course, King was careful to distinguish between violent and non-violent direction 
action, ‘earnestly opposing’ the former, while advocating the latter. Yet the basic 
premise – of using dissent to force a confrontation in situations where those in 
power have refused to listen and failed to negotiate – has some resonance with the 
situation of the 2011 rioters.  In a widely quoted news clip, a young man in 
Tottenham was asked if rioting actually achieved anything. "Yes," he said. "You 
wouldn't be talking to me now if we didn't riot, would you?" He went on to explain: 
“Two months ago we marched to Scotland Yard, more than 2,000 of us, all blacks, 
and it was peaceful and calm and you know what? Not a word in the press. Last night 
a bit of rioting and looting and look around you."35 
 
Indeed, one might argue that the contemporary political landscape is one where the 
opportunities for traditional forms of civil disobedience are far more limited—by 
virtue of heightened security controls, surveillance technologies and anti-protest 
laws which makes such actions increasingly less feasible but also because of a 
broader sense of political malaise and disillusionment. For many, conventional 
strategies of protest are seen as much less effective than they once were, at least in 
the sense that governments are both more able to ignore protestors on the one 
hand and criminalize them on the other.36  Particularly for those who feel alienated 
formal politics or who reject the social controls and bourgeois values regularly 
                                                        
34 King, Letter from a Birmingham Jail (The Martin Luther King, Jr. Research and 
Education Institute, 1963). 
35Fletcher, The sad truth behind the London riot (NBC News, 2011).  
36 Power, 'Dangerous Subjects: UK Students and the Criminalization of Protest', 
South Atlantic Quarterly 111 (2012), pp. 412-20; El-Enany, 'Innocence Charged with 
Guilt': The Criminalisation of Protest from Peterloo to Millbank ed. Pritchard and 
Pakes, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2014). 
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imposed them, public disorder can itself be a form of protest.37 So it is perhaps not 
surprising that some participants in the riots may have been partially driven by a 
sense of political apathy turned into recklessness and a desire to taste power on the 
streets—even if only momentarily and at high social costs. 
 
It may be that the conventional image of dissent that circulates in the popular 
political imagination does not adequately map on to the gritty reality of dissent 
expressed on the streets. Arguably the left has long held a rather romanticized view 
of dissent, particularly in the figure of the righteous political leader whose 
courageous acts of civil disobedience express clearly and strategically targeted 
opposition to oppression.  Yet it is important to remember that these popularized 
expressions of dissent are often far more greatly revered after the fact, than at the 
time. The actions of figures such as Martin Luther King, Rosa Parks, Angela Davis, 
Che Guevera and Nelson Mandela are now portrayed as heroic dissenters (often cast 
in popular culture in their most palatable and least radical form) even though at the 
time, their actions were far less well received and far more controversial.    
 
Perhaps we like the idea of dissent more than we like dissent itself. We like the 
spectacle of dissent, more than the actual experience of it.  We enjoy consuming 
films, music and cultural images that depict the heroic figure of the rebel, the 
activist, the dissenter, but we are less keen when dissent is actually in our midst. 
Particularly when dissent is directed towards us, or when it makes our lives 
inconvenient or difficult, or when it turns out to be messy and unruly, it becomes far 
less palatable.  It is easy to be self-righteous about dissent when it is far away or 
targeted at someone else; much less so when the dissent is directed our way.  
 
Similarly, although challenging the criminalization of dissent has long been a staple 
of left-wing politics, this critique is often selectively applied; it is often limited to 
those who actions and identities fit within particular repertoires of dissent.  Those 
whose expressions of dissent are chaotic and complex, those who do not fit the 
more romanticized notions of resistance, or those who straddle the line between 
deserving and undeserving are unlikely to enjoy the benefits of collective support.  
Particularly among the mainstream left, political leaders must increasingly distance 
themselves from groups engaged in law-breaking behavior rather than critique the 
conditions that produce law breaking behavior itself—no doubt part of much 
broader trends where political credibility is increasingly undermined by any 
association with those characterized as criminals. Hence the form of dissent, and its 
proximity to criminalization, matters increasingly more than the circumstances or 
impetus for dissent. 
 
In a similar way that many feminists, particularly black feminists, have been accused 
of being ‘too angry’ when they express their dissent, a critique of the mode of 
                                                        
37 See for example, Tomsen’s discussion of drinking violence as ‘a form of symbolic 
protest again aspects of bourgeois morality’, in A Top Night: Social Protest, 
Masculinity and the Culture of Drinking Violence, The British Journal of Criminology 
1997, 37 (1): 90-102. 
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delivery can used to displace or deflect from the substance of the dissenting view.  
Like a bureaucratized complaints system, only those who follow procedures properly 
will have their grievance considered. Those who do not follow the expected 
protocols will be rejected or denied their hearing.  Even those who express their 
complaints within the requirements but do so in a way that exceeds convention – 
those who do not behave as expected – will have their grievance dismissed.  
 
In a more mundane and less spectacular context, I am mindful of my own students 
who are sometimes chastised for the ways they express their dissent. I work at an 
institution that has a commitment to widening access to education, where a high 
proportion of our students come from impoverished and highly disadvantaged 
backgrounds.  Their life experiences have taught them that they have to fight for 
almost everything they need. Many have come to expect that they will frequently be 
denied what they are entitled to, whether it be welfare, access to services or 
employment. They have learned in their daily lives that the promise of access or 
success that is available to others will not actually be available to them.38  They have 
learned that when they are denied something it will often be justified in a way that 
places the responsibility entirely on their shoulders. Over time their default position 
sometimes becomes a defensive one; they must be prepared for being denied what 
they need and in turn, ready to fight for those needs.  So when something goes 
wrong in the education setting, some react strongly and fiercely.  In such situations, 
these students are seen as ‘difficult’, ‘demanding’ or ‘needy’ in contrast to those 
students whose lives of class and racial entitlement means that they can express 
their grievances more amicably, precisely because they are accustomed to getting 
what they need and want. Hence the students who are often most able to express 
dissent through ‘the proper channels’ or by ‘the correct means’ are also frequently 
the students with access to the most resources and privilege.  Those with the most 
precarious lives and the least time and resources, those struggling with a variety of 
complex issues, whose patience has finally run out, sometimes react in ways that are 
unpalatable to the institution. While higher education staff may deem those 
students to be trouble-makers or ‘problem students’, by another view they are 
engaged in survival strategies.  
 
The disavowal of these everyday expressions dissent, though seemingly far from the 
reactions to rioters, arguably fit within a broader continuum where the dividing lines 
between deserving and undeserving subjects become ever more stringent; such 
quotidian dismissals work to normalize and re-entrench wider commonsense notions 
of what can be heard as legitimate dissent. Indeed, the increasingly punitive 
reactions to formal student protests – most evident in the criminal responses to the 
2010 wave of student occupations, direct actions and protest marches in the UK 
which challenged the slashing of higher education funding and the dramatic raising 
                                                        
38 Certainly, access to education does not necessarily translate into success, as 
revealed by current statistics on retention, attainment and post-education 
employment, which continue to demonstrate significant differentials along class, 
race and gender and disability lines.  
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of tuition fees39 —fit a pattern whereby those whose actions are deemed ‘uncivil’ 
are more readily demonized for the ways they express dissent. 
  
Sara Ahmed writes about this when she describes “the problem of becoming the 
problem because you are trying to address a problem that others do not wish to 
recognize as a problem.”40  We turn the one who raises the problem into the 
problem itself.  Here Ahmed is specifically writing about the challenge of confronting 
sexual harassment in institutions, not the dilemmas of riots.  Yet there are parallels 
to the ways in which unpalatable expressions of dissent, which arise in response to 
deeper problems, are translated into the main problem itself.  Criminalizing and 
demonizing rioters becomes a way to recast the problem as bad behavior warranting 
individual punishment, rather than a set of wider issues for which broader social 
responsibility needed to be taken. Such translation arguably becomes possible when 
the terms by which dissent is defined and heard are so narrow that we cannot hear 
or recognize expressions that exceed our expected comfort zone.  If riots are ‘the 
language of the unheard’, one of the questions to be considered is not just what the 
unheard are trying to say, but why others do not – or cannot – hear it. It is easy to 
support those who actions follow our expected scripts of dissent.  But what about 
the expressions of dissent that are hard to hear, that are less palatable to digest, 
that force us to confront things we would rather not deal with? 
 
Of course, many would argue that it is dangerous to define political dissent too 
broadly.41 To treat rioters on par with those who explicitly organize under a specific 
political banner is to potentially devalue and undermine the importance of organized 
consciousness raising and collective organizing. No doubt it is important to 
distinguish between those who have an explicit sense of political consciousness – 
and those who are simply reacting against the conditions or circumstances that they 
find themselves in. That difference can be the determining factor between an 
eruption that can be easily quelled and the beginnings of a powerfully organized 
political mobilization. But this is perhaps precisely why we need to listen differently 
and more carefully to the expressions of dissent that challenge expectations.  Social 
movements capable of bringing about change are certainly not built without 
consciousness, but they are often triggered and bolstered from moments and 
expressions of dissent, albeit incoherent and sometimes not-fully-formed 
sentiments.  
 
Yet lines need to be drawn somewhere and not all dissent is equal or defensible. 
There is no shortage of examples of reactionary dissent and backlash to progressive 
social change.  In that sense, dissent is not an inherent ‘good’ in and of itself. Dissent 
always occurs in relation to something – and the content and context of what is 
being objected to matters greatly.  So the question remains as to what criteria 
determines the boundaries of legitimate dissent. However, the question I wish to 
                                                        
39 Power, pp. 412-20. 
40 Ahmed, Wound Up (feministkilljoys.com, 2017), 
https://feministkilljoys.com/2017/01/04/wound-up/, accessed 1 August 2017. 
41 Hall and Winlow, p. 108. 
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foreground here is the way in which these distinctions affect the distribution of 
political solidarity.  The question is not just about how and why these lines get 
drawn, but with what consequence and for whom.  
 
I am reminded of the distinction between ‘political prisoners’ and ‘social prisoners’. 
I, like many others, am troubled by these categorizations. While acknowledging that 
there is a particular significance in being locked up explicitly for the expression of 
one’s political beliefs or actions, these categories tend to rest on problematic 
distinctions between deserving and undeserving – namely that it is easier to make 
the case that people should not be locked up for their politics than for those who 
have broken the law in the context of their economic or social status. Underpinning 
the distinction is a sense that political prisoners are not like ‘real criminals’ and while 
the former do not ‘deserve’ to be in prison, the latter implicitly do. So while the 
distinction is often aimed to generate support and solidarity for the former, it 
frequently leads to the social abandonment of the latter. Many prisoner justice 
activists have raised this issue by challenging the limits of individually-focused 
campaigns used to address the problem of mass incarceration. Attempts to focus on 
the most deserving prisoners – those whose cases are most likely to garner public 
sympathy—tend to prioritize either the wrongfully convicted or those whom Marie 
Gottschalk calls the ‘non, non, nons’  (i.e. prisoners convicted for non-violent, non-
serious, non-sexual offences).42 But in doing so, challenging the broader logics of the 
prison system itself are jettisoned in favor of a focus on individual cases.  Moreover, 
it is often those who are designated as the least deserving who are most likely to be 
the most vulnerable to violence and the most in need of support. In this sense, the 
political distribution of solidarity as allocated to those who are deemed most 
deserving may not correspond to those most in need.  
 
Another underlying difficulty is that the impetus to express solidarity is inevitably 
structured by the ‘we’ formation; we tend to care most about those who we already 
deem most ‘like us’, those to whom we see ourselves as most closely connected or 
related. For this reason Iris Marion Young argues that ‘Political theorists and activists 
should distrust this desire for reciprocal recognition and identification with others ... 
because it denies difference in the concrete sense of making it difficult for people to 
respect those with whom they do not identify.’43 As such, the motivation to express 
solidarity cannot be easily disentangled from the broader social norms that construct 
some subjects as inherently worthy of concern and others as fundamentally 
undeserving.  
 
                                                        
42 Gottschalk, Caught: The Prison State and the Lockdown of American Politics 
(Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2015), 165. 
43 Young, 'The Ideal of Community and the Politics of Difference', Social Theory and 
Practice 12 (1986), pp. 12. See also David’s Garland discussion of the ‘criminology of 
the self’ and ‘criminology of the other’ in Garland, The Culture of Control: Crime and 
Social Order in Contemporary Society (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001), pg 
137.  
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Yet expressions of social and political solidarity need not be conditional upon the 
endorsement or acceptance of the actions, beliefs or values of the individual or 
group in question. Solidarity in its most basic form might simply mean an expression 
of opposition against harsh treatment, a stance against social abandonment. It might 
mean taking a position that focuses less on the merits of individual actions and more 
on the broader social consequences that expressions of solidarity versus non-
solidarity might generate. In other words, one does not need to celebrate or valorize 
the actions of the 2011 rioters to question the reactionary responses, which 
subsequently enabled the punishment and social abandonment of individuals from 
some of the most disadvantaged groups in the country. The conditional linking of 
support and solidarity to those expressing dissent in exclusively worthy and 
legitimate ways meant that those most in need of solidarity were least likely to 
receive it.  
 
Arguably, political solidarity is often most needed where it is least easily given. For 
this reason, it is precisely the forms of unpalatable dissent – the disquieting dissent, 
the unruly and disorderly dissent, the expressions that generate tension and 
discomfort—that warrant the most careful attention and reflection.  As Sara Ahmed 
reminds us, the word "dissidence" derives from the Latin dis—"apart" and sedere "to 
sit." “The dissident is the one who sits apart.”44 For those whose dissent is easily 
recognized and condoned, by sitting apart from one situation or group they also sit 
together with others. Those who attend a public demonstration to ‘sit apart’ from 
government policy are at the same time sitting together with others who share their 
dissent. But what about those who sit alone, or have no one to sit with? What about 
those with no seat at all? Those are the dissenters for whom the question of the 
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